Most of America’s Confederate statues were erected after Reconstruction, therefore critics view them as a white supremacist response to advances in civil rights. Beyond that, as memorials to a traitorous enemy. A longtime critic of Rebel statues myself, my arguments heavily relied on this talking point: What nation memorializes its enemies? It turns out some do. Let’s take a look at notable examples:
Cuba: Memorial to U.S. Soldiers Who Died at San Juan Hill
An unremarkable tomb behind iron bars in Santiago memorializes U.S. soldiers killed in the Cuban-Spanish-American War (official name in Cuba). Though the memorial may have been installed during U.S. occupation (1906-1909), Fidel Castro’s Communist regime and successors (1959-present) continue to display the tablet crediting the U.S. Army’s Second Division, Fifth Corps.
The U.S. Second Division was responsible for attacking the Spanish outer line of defenses during the Battle of San Juan Hill, succeeding after a 10-hour battle on July 1, 1898 (p. 8 of link). The names and ranks of every U.S. soldier killed during those 10 hours are listed on the Santiago memorial, even though First Secretary Fidel Castro viewed the United States as an “imperialist Government..of genocide and decadence” that had colonized Cuba.
South Korea: Statue of Brothers
A war that killed 137,899 South Korean soldiers, up to 520,000 of their North Korean counterparts, and segregated Koreans into these separate classifications to this day, is commemorated in Seoul by the Statue of Brothers. The War Memorial of Korea’s signature statue promotes a reconciliation narrative between the divided peninsula similar to controversial narratives associated with Confederate statues in the United States.
While generally agreed upon in the U.S. that Civil War monuments incorporating themes of reconciliation between North and South are anachronistic, the Statue of Brothers ignores this logic. The 11-meter high statue depicts a Republic of Korea (South) soldier embracing his younger brother, a North Korean Army soldier. The brothers of the opposing nations embrace on the battlefield to “express reconciliation, love, and forgiveness” according to the monument’s translated text.
Mexico City National Cemetery
Since 1946 the federal government of Mexico has permitted the American Battle Monuments Commission to maintain the oldest known burial ground for fallen American servicemembers outside the United States. Mexico City National Cemetery contains the remains of 813 American servicemen, including 750 unidentified American dead from the Mexican-American War.
Known as Intervención estadounidense (United States intervention) or Invasión Yanqui in Mexico, the successful invasion was marred by American atrocities. While U.S. regular army soldiers conducted themselves in line with the Mexicans, U.S. volunteers regularly committed larceny, murder, and rape. If a Mexican civilian protested the theft of their possessions, like a blanket or livestock, U.S. volunteers routinely shot them.
The army’s highest-ranking officer Gen. Winfield Scott wrote to the Secretary of War: “if a tenth of what is said is true, [the volunteers] have committed atrocities–horrors–in Mexico, sufficient to make Heaven weep, & every American, of Christian morals blush for his country.” Mexican newspaper Diario Del Gobierno lamented American soldiers having “sacked our homes, taken our daughters from their families…kicking over the body of Jesus Christ and getting drunk from our sacred chalices” concluding, “May they be damned by all Christians, as they are by God.”
Despite these atrocities, for almost two centuries a country whose instability was aided by an American war of occupation has permitted a military cemetery in its capital containing the remains of that occupying force. As a result of the war, Mexico ceded California, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, most of Arizona and Colorado, and parts of Oklahoma, Kansas, and Wyoming to the U.S., cutting its territorial size in half.
Vietnam: John Sidney McCain Memorial
When U.S. Navy pilot John McCain parachuted into Truc Bach Lake in Hanoi after ejecting from a missile-downed A-4E Skyhawk on October 26, 1967, local residents angry over U.S. bombing campaigns dragged him from the wreckage, eventually memorializing the capture in a lakeside statue.
McCain Memorial on Truc Bach Lake in Hanoi, author’s photo April 2018
McCain, who traveled to Vietnam often as a U.S. senator to promote reconciliation between the former enemies, joked on one visit: “it’s always nice to check on the condition of my statue. It’s the only one I got.” The text of the monument initially contained the Vietnamese pejorative prefix Tên before McCain’s name, a classifier for despicable individuals such enemies, thieves, etc.
Vietnamese has language classifiers that can be added or dropped before an individual’s name to show how the speaker feels towards the subject. In May 2015, the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam brought McCain to view revised text on the monument, with the pejorative prefix replaced by phi cong, meaning pilot. The change was requested by Secretary of the Hanoi Party Committee Phạm Quang Nghị as a gesture of reconciliation between the two nations.
In a further symbol of reconciliation, when McCain died in August 2018, 50 years after they pulled the Navy pilot out of Truc Bach Lake, Hanoi residents left flowers at his memorial. One man said, “He was among those Americans who support Vietnam the most in normalizing relations with the U.S.”
James Longstreet: a Confederate general whose racial views evolved
Maybe it’s irrelevant if other nations commemorate their enemies. Notwithstanding this talking point, the selection of Confederate statues was clearly political, lending credence to critics’ view of these monuments as a white supremacist response to advances in civil rights. Historian and Reconstruction expert Eric Foner writes in The New York Times that most Confederate monument building took place in the 1890s, with figures selected based on their association with the Confederacy’s Lost Cause idealization then taking shape.
“If the issue were simply heritage, why are there no statues of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, one of Gen. Robert E. Lee’s key lieutenants? Not because of poor generalship; indeed, Longstreet warned Lee against undertaking Pickett’s Charge, which ended the battle of Gettysburg. Longstreet’s crime came after the Civil War: He endorsed black male suffrage and commanded the Metropolitan Police of New Orleans, which in 1874 engaged in armed combat with white supremacists seeking to seize control of the state government. Longstreet is not a symbol of white supremacy; therefore he was largely ineligible for commemoration by those who long controlled public memory in the South.”
Foner is correct that Longstreet is divisive among Confederate sympathizers due to his postwar support for Black rights and actions at the Battle of Liberty Place. But the renowned Civil War historian is incorrect in one way. A statue of Longstreet does exist, tucked away at Gettysburg National Military Park. And perhaps an appropriate middle ground can be found in its example.
Unlike Robert E. Lee’s equestrian statue that towered over Monument Avenue in majority-Black Richmond or the Lee sculpture in Charlottesville that served as a white supremacist rallying point, at Gettysburg Longstreet is perched on a horse at ground level. Eye to eye with his countrymen, all of whom now enjoy equal protection of the law.
Author’s photo of graffitied Robert E. Lee statue behind barriers in Richmond, VA after summer 2020 protests. The statue was removed by the state on September 8, 2021 and donated to the Black History Museum and Cultural Center of Virginia. The traffic circle is now a patch of bare grass.
Above: Author’s photo taken from Imperial Hotel Hue rooftop depicting locations of tour stops associated with U.S. Marines of Fox and Hotel Companies 2nd Battalion/5th Regiment in Hue February 1-February 6, 1968
This is the third and final chapter of a battlefield guide covering U.S. Marine sites at the Battle of Hue City in January/February 1968. You can find Chapter 1 here and Chapter 2 here. A Google Maps link of the associated sites is included in each stop title
After Golf Co. (G/2/5) sustained 55 killed and wounded in its failure to enter the Citadel on January 31, 1968, the Marines focused on capturing the city south of the Perfume River by fighting it out “house to house and from room to room,” according to the company commander in an interview with CBS’s John Lawrence. At 7:00AM on February 1, Col Marcus Gravel launched a two-company assault aimed at taking the prison and Thua Thien Provincial Admin Complex six blocks away from their starting point at the MACV Compound.
Who Fought Here?
Capt Michael “Mike” P. Downs’ newly arrived Fox Company (F/2/5) joined the assault at 3:00 PM on February 1 after being choppered to a landing zone (LZ) along the river and soon found out what Golf Co. had learned the previous day, advancing a single city block was no simple task.
Fox(trot) Company (Capt Michael “Mike” P. Downs)
First Platoon
Second Platoon (Lt Rich Horner)
Third Platoon (Lt Don Hausrath)
Twenty-seven year old Martha’s Vineyard native,Capt. Downs reported 3 dead and 13 wounded in his company’s attempt to reach some isolated U.S. Army signal troops. After being pulled back to the Marine Command Post (CP), Downs was ordered to lead Fox Co. on a night attack on the provincial prison. Upon capturing the prison, the NVA freed 2,000 prisoners, 500 of which joined combat units while the rest were used as laborers. U.S Marine HQ Task Force X-Ray’s “fixation…on relieving the prison ultimately shaped the course of the battle south of the Perfume [River]” (Hammel, 2006, p. 82) over the next week.
Downs questioned the order to take the prison because “[it was] not reflective of the situation in the city at the time,” (Camp, 2019, p. 24) and eventually convinced HQ to rescind the order. Typical of his command style, Downs worried about the fate of the men under his command after receiving deadly orders. Claiming the same attitude towards Vietnamese, Downs said at a Hue 50th anniversary event: “We take care of civilians.”
Then and now comparison of Marines along Le Loi street attempting to take the University, author’s modern photo edited to show above Cpl. William Peterson’s photo (page 38, Leatherneck July 2013)
Not so in the NVA’s case. For almost 48 continuous hours February 1-February 2, the depleted Golf Co. (down to 170 Marines out of 300) attempted to take the University of Hue a block away from MACV. On February 3 when they finally arrived in the University courtyard, now a serene hotel pool, LCpl George L. Haught Jr. said the company found civilian bodies scattered throughout. Attributing civilians in Hue as sympathizers of the South Vietnam government, the NVA used them for target practice to get the sight of their .50 caliber machine guns perched in gun towers above the courtyard.
Author’s photo of Saigon Hotel Morin pool and courtyard, site of NVA/VC civilian massacre
Before taking the University, LCpl Haught’s squad cleared a house with an 8 year old boy sitting stunned in a squatted position next to his dead mother and sister, both of whom had been raped. Haught further recalled coming across two elderly women who had been chopped to death with machetes, saying of the 3,000-5,000 civilian casualties overall: “it was just practically every place you went.”
G/2/5 M-60 machine gunner Larry Ortiz reflected on the bloody afternoon of February 1, 1968 three years later in a college assignment: “the Lieutenant had received word (by radio) of an ARVN General who was holed up in a house not too far from our present position. We checked out the place where he was supposed to have been, but found nothing. There were several dead NVA lying in the street. We had been escorted by a tank. The tank driver spotted a dead NVA in the middle of the road and purposely ran over him. He stopped the tank right on top of the body. When we had not found what we were looking for, we turned back. The tank turned 180 degrees smearing the dead man’s remains all over the street. As much as I hated them (VC), this gruesome sight made me sick to my stomach.”
The Communist forces at Hue were “mixed companies of People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), more popularly known as NVA, and People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF)–the armed insurgent force in South Vietnam more popularly known as Viet Cong” (Willbanks, 2021, p. 33). The North Vietnamese were armed with SKS Simonov and M1 Garand rifles (Camp, 2019, p. 40) and came from the following regiments and battalions:
4th Regiment and 804th K4B Battalions
6th Regiment and 800th, 802nd, and 806th Battalions
416th Battalion, 5th Regiment
7th and 8th Battalions, 90th Regiment
7th Battalion, 9th Regiment
Hue City Sapper Battalion
12th Sapper Battalion “carried as probable participant and 24th Regiment, 4th and 6th Battalion considered possible participants” (Camp, 2019, p. 23).
The Communist defensive system was organized around strongpoints as Marine author Col. Richard D. Campexplained in Death in the Imperial City: U.S. Marines in the Battle for Hue. Strongpoints were NVA-occupied city buildings that acted as “heavily fortified defensive positions armed with automatic weapons…The NVA often built small bunkers for automatic weapons on the first floor and placed snipers in the upper stories” using “interlocking bands of fire, leaving allied troops no way to get around them (Camp, 2019, p. 35).”
Who Commanded Here?
Some Marines of Golf Co. theorized the highest profile North Vietnamese commander was a tan suit, flak-jacket clad Chinese adviser wearing a gas mask who they called The Banker. Given the nickname because of the way he dressed, LCpl Haught remembered The Banker surrounding himself with civilians, and added, “Every place you seen him you were gonna find a lot of bodies behind.”
In the History Channel documentary Vietnam on the Frontlines, PFC Bill Purcell, Alpha Co. 1/1 Marines, described his NVA counterparts as “[not] some little wiry guy running around the bushes in sandals. These fellas had full uniforms, big packs, and good operating rifles. They were about somewhere between five foot six and five foot 10. I mean they were good sized guys.”
North Vietnamese forces had an extreme advantage in manpower and terrain. 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (2/5) Commander LtC Ernest “Ernie” Cheatham Jr.said of the long odds his battalion faced: “They took on an enemy that was stronger than they were. Maybe twice or three times as strong as they were. And the enemy was not attacking. The enemy was in defensive positions prepared for us. And the Marines were attacking and that’s against all odds.”
Commander Cheatham, a 39 year old Korean War Vet, was a former defensive tackle for the Baltimore Colts and Pittsburgh Steelers who had to assure Steelers Team President Art Rooney in 1954 that he would be discharged in time for preseason camp. Cheatham contributed to a 1954 Steelers defense that forced Hall of Famer Otto Graham into the highest-INT performance of his career and compared Marine tactics in hitting NVA strongpoints to football: “kill them inside or flush them out the back for the men watching the exits. Then, taking the next building, two men rush the front. It sounds simple but timing has to be just as good as a football play,” (Camp, 2019, p. 38). When Cheathamarrived in Hue, the three companies of Fox, Golf, and Hotel reverted to his control from Col Gravel.
Top: Los Angeles Evening Citizen News Nov 24, 1951 Bottom: The Whittier News, Jun 8, 1954
What did they say about it later?
Two seriously wounded Marines found gallows humor in the desperate situation. Ray Roman took a round through his helmet that ricocheted off the marble University floors. Years later he often joked to company mate George Haught: I invented the razor cut.” Haught added reflectively, “You know 50 years later you can poke fun. He’s not with us anymore.”
Evening Review East Liverpool, Ohio, October 3, 1968
Civilian Haught and four friends enlisted together on his 16th birthday. Cpl Haught was wounded 13 times in Hue, returning to the aid station once. The 20-year-old Ohioan took a face full of terra cotta when an NVA K-50M Submachine Gunner opened up on the courtyard from the top of the University, and also broke his collarbone. “You really don’t feel it that much. You just block it out,” said Haught in 2022.
During the University fighting John L. Canley, a 30-year old gunnery sergeant seen throughout the battle with a cigarette hanging out of his mouth, brought a mortally wounded comrade into the MACV aid station. With his signature “Do you want to live forever?” macho attitude on full display, he joked at the bloody sights around him: “They got us coming in here like a bunch of teenage virgins!”
Canley had his Navy Cross upgraded to the Medal of Honor in October 2018, becoming the first Black Marine to be awarded the nation’s highest military honor. Though Black people only represented 11% of the American civilian population in 1967, they represented 23% of all combat troops in Vietnam and in 1965 nearly 25% of all combat deaths. The retired Sgt Canley, who took command of Alpha Company 1/1 in the early fighting at Hue, died at age 84 on May 12, 2022 after a long battle with prostate cancer. Canley said in 2018: “The only thing I was doing was taking care of troops best I could. Do that, and everything else takes care of itself. They are an inspiration to me to this day.”
President Trump presents retired U.S. Marine Sgt. Maj. John Canley with his upgraded Medal of Honor Wednesday, Oct. 17, 2018, in the East Room of the White House. Source: Trump White House Archives (Public Domain) Trump claimed at the ceremony that despite being underage, “John used his brother’s paperwork to enlist.”
Who fell here?
Given the long odds in reclaiming the South Vietnam provincial capital city, Marines often returned to combat while still wounded. PFC Horace Howard, a 23-year-old Philadelphian from Second Platoon was shot five times on G/2/5’s January 31 bridge crossing before succumbing to additional wounds sustained overnight on February 1 when the NVA tried to take a U.S. military compound. The official casualty reason was given as gunshot or small arms fire.
Descended from generations of South Carolinians, Horace was the third child of Pearlene, a private home cook, and David Howard, a baker at Edens Food Stores in Columbia. Both parents attended school through only the fifth grade. Though born in Florence, SC on August 11, 1944, sibling-of-8 Horace spent his formative years in Philadelphia and a fellow Marine from G/2/5 remembered Howard wanted to use the GI Bill to go to Temple University “because it was the best school in Philly.”
Growing up when doo wop was big in Philadelphia clearly had its influence on the future Marine. LCpl George Haught recalled Howard halfheartedly envisioning himself a singer while in Vietnam. “His thing was he was going back to Philly and stand around a burn barrel and make four part harmony (Boyz II Men) and go to Temple.”
Haught recalled laughter with Howard and the men of 2/5 over his singing and concluded, “he was one hell of a Marine…He was loved and it really hurt when he was gone…Vietnam wasn’t all grim. There were times like this that stick in our minds to erase the dark times.”
A news clip from the February 8, 1968 Philadelphia Inquirer claims that the Protestant Rifleman Howard wrote in his final letter home: “I’m going to come home. I have faith in God.” The 23-year-old was survived by his fiancée, parents, three brothers, and five sisters, and is buried at Beverly National Cemetery in New Jersey across the Delaware River from Philadelphia, a short drive from his boyhood home.
In “largely a day of consolidation” (Hammel, 2006, p. 84) on February 2, the Marines lost 2 dead and 34 wounded south of the river compared to 140 killed for the NVA. The majority of 2/5 casualties were sustained by Fox Co. (1 killed, 16 wounded). With Meadows’ Golf Co. securing the University that afternoon, the Marines’ focus turned to the Treasury, hospital, and prison, heavily defended strongpoints in the way of their objective: the Provincial Admin Complex.
With 1/1 Marines on their left, 2/5 launched their attacks towards the Provincial Admin Complex en echelon, Fox Co. assigned to the Treasury on the left, Hotel Co. assigned to capture the hospital on the right, and Golf Co. in reserve ready to come across the flank of either after taking the prison. Cheatham launched the two-company tank-supported attacks from the University after setting up his CP at 1:00 PM February 3.
The NVA held off five attacks throughout the day by Fox Co. to take the Treasury, thanks in part to walls “four or five feet thick, preventing rifle fire from penetrating the concrete” (Camp, 2019, p. 29). Additionally the undersized Marine companies could only present a frontage of one city block per each company. Meaning that when Hotel attacked the hospital, their flank went unprotected when Fox assaulted the Treasury simultaneously. However, the 4th NVA Regiment would eventually pay for its failure to seize MACV and Highway 1 south of the river, as the North Vietnamese soldiers “had allowed a U.S. Marine combat force–initially a very weak one–to enter the heart of the city” (Hammel, 2006, p. 101).
New to the fight was Capt. Ron Christmas’ Hotel Co. that arrived via convoy the previous day. Slated to launch the first attack, they found more success than Fox Co. and were able to take the low buildings on Ly Thuong Kiet Street fronting their objective. The 28 year old Philadelphian, who joined the Marines soon after graduating from Penn, found success with the 106mm recoilless rifle in particular.
U.S. 106mm recoilless rifle on display at War Remnants Museum Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, author’s photo taken March 2018
Since the NVA fired blindly any time they saw smoke, 2/5 was unsuccessful using the textbook urban combat advice to throw grenades and run a fire team across the street. In the History Channel documentary Vietnam on the Frontlines Christmas credited a young lance corporal with the idea to roll out the anti-tank weapons on flatbed trucks and fire down Le Loi Street to provide cover fire for units to cross Le Loi. “106 recoilless rifle is a wonderful anti-tank weapon. I salivate every time I think of it…We learned that morning how to cross streets.” Despite a ban on air support in the historic city being lifted on February 3, the close proximity fighting prevented U.S. bombing from having any strategic purpose. Capt. Christmas described Hue as, “a 35 meter fight. You’re looking at who you’re killing directly in the eye.”
Who Fought Here?
After three days of fighting, by February 3 LtC Cheatham’s “cut-down battalion numbered approximately 700 well-armed Marines” (Hammel, 2006, p. 102), compared to the NVA who at one point had 8,000 soldiers dug in on both sides of the river. Fox Co. found more success February 4, jumping off across Ly Thuong Kiet Street from the University at 7:00 AM. Capt Mike Downs’ Fox Co. benefited from two companies from 1/1 Marines available to screen his left flank. Additionally, elements of Golf Co. supported both company’s attacks “with 3.5-inch rocket launchers and M-60 machine guns high up and along the southeast side of the university” (Hammel, 2006, p. 114).
Yellow building at bottom left is the Treasury, 4:01 view Marines had as they began advance on Le Loi Street with Perfume River on their right flank
Christmas’ Hotel Co. continued their method of firing M40s and 106mm recoilless rifles into the street to force enemy troops to keep their heads down so Marines could cross. M40s were added to the equation to blast holes through buildings so Marine units could get in without using the entrance. Maj. Ralph Salvati of Fox can be credited with his company taking the Treasury February 4. The Silver Star recipient, received for actions that afternoon, suggested using tear gas to clear the building. Under protection of 81mm mortars and 3.5-inch rockets, gas mask-clad Fox Co. successfully ejected the NVA from the Treasury and claimed the building. However, after holding the hospital against Hotel Co. for a second day, the NVA could also boast that its sappers had blown the An Cuu Bridge, “effectively closing the land route into the city,” (Camp, 2019, p. 30) the final route into Hue south of the Perfume River.
2/5’s delay in taking the hospital was partially due to the NVA’s willingness to fight in civilian centers. Despite the University fighting racking up the severest casualties for both Marines and NVA, LCpl George Haught said the hospital was the hardest building to take because “You just couldn’t go in and start shooting things up…you had patients in there. Were they real patients? Were they NVA? You had to exercise a whole lot more care.”
By February 5, Commander Cheatham was usually required to commit his reserve. This left Golf Co. fully committed in their assault on the hospital complex. Their first objective was to clear the Cercle Sportif, a social club and sports center for Hue’s upper class referred to by the Marines as the Yacht Club.
At 8:40 AM, Lt William “Bill” Rogers’ Third Platoon were hit by the NVA along a rock wall between the Cercle Sportif and hospital complex. Though the NVA fired intensely on the first Marines who entered the complex, G/2/5 “attacked in strength and entered the lavish sports center without further opposition” (Hammel, 2006, p. 154).
Who Fell Here?
M-60 machine gunner Larry Ortiz was shot in the leg securing a third level terrace facing the hospital with his gun team. He became one of many wounded by NVA counterfire from the large force at the hospital complex. In an annotation of his recollections from February 5, Ortiz wrote, “some Marines to my right saw that I was bleeding profusely from my leg and I and my A-gunner made a plan where I would continue to fire and move to my left as he crawled over the top of me to take control of the machine gun and provide covering fire giving me the opportunity to head downstairs into the building where a first aid station had been set up.” A company mate said that Ortiz, “crawled inside, drug himself up…and fired away for about another 45 minutes before he lost so much blood he just passed out.” He and other wounded Marines were not evacuated until late in the afternoon because heavy fighting prevented helicopters from accessing the city.
After accomplishing their morning objectives, 2/5 halted to resupply ammunition from 1:00-3:00 PM before engaging in some of the heaviest fighting of the day at 4:00 PM when small-arms fire and RPGs erupted on top of Golf’s position outside of the hospital complex “until the NVA defenders finally broke and ran.” Golf Co. secured the hospital complex at 4:32 PM after a “92-minute assault–in which Marine tanks, 106mm recoilless rifles, and 3.5 inch rocket launchers played pivotal roles” (Hammel, 2006, p. 160). In the fighting on February 5, the three companies of 2/5 killed 70 NVA (Camp, 2019, p. 35).
What did they say about it later?
Left to Right: PFC Clyde Carter (KIA 1/31/1968) covered in Chapter Two, LCpl Fernando “Pache” Camarillo (KIA 5/29/1968), Larry Ortiz, and Clint Faulkner. Photo taken December 1967 at An Hoa Combat Base, from Larry Ortiz’s personal collection, touched up by author
Larry Ortiz on the above photo: “I was the machine gunner, Camarillo was my A-gunner and the other two were “Ammo Humpers”…Enlarge the photo and take a close look at our uniforms and see how filthy we were…I can remember taking a shower at An Hoa maybe twice. It was a rigged up shower with water poured into a 50 gal. drum set on a platform raised above a shower head.
…Otherwise we went without bathing sometimes for several weeks at a time…we sometimes set in by the river and posted security and [were] able to get in the river to bathe. The process was to jump in the river with our uniforms on. Take your bar of soap with you to soap up your uniform and after the uniform was washed with the bar of soap and rinsed in the river, we stripped and washed ourselves.”
Second from left in the above photo, LCpl Fernando “Pache” Camarillo Jr. was killed in Vietnam later in 1968 the day after his 20th birthday. Born to first generation Mexican-Americans including a WWII-Vet father, the San Antonio native survived weeks of hellish house-to-house fighting in Hue without being wounded, but was KIA May 29, 1968 north of Da Nang. Camarillo’s tiny West Side school district Edgewood ISD lost 54 people in Vietnam. Ortiz referred to Pache as “one helluva good Marine and friend” and wrote in November 1971, “Watching my friends die is a heartache I will never be able to forget.” Camarillo is buried at Fort Sam Houston in the same National Cemetery where his parents are interred.
The morning of February 6, three companies of 2/5 were on the verge of reaching their objective of a sixth city block claimed in as many days. With Fox suffering the heaviest fire on their left flank, Golf Co. in the center was met with relatively low resistance, and Hotel approached the goal that had been set five days earlier: the Thua Thien Provincial Admin Complex.
By late afternoon, Capt Mike Downs’ Fox Co. secured the last of the hospital complex, losing 4 killed and 11 wounded compared to 20 NVA killed (Camp, 2019, p. 40). After Fox secured the hospital, Golf Co. launched a final attack on the prison that took the first significant number of NVA prisoners during the battle.
Backed up against their last significant strongpoints south of the river, the NVA holed up in the Provincial Admin Complex courtyard “threw everything they had at us,” according to Capt. Ron Christmas whose Hotel Co. took mortars, rockets, and sniper fire and responded with CS gas and his favorite: the 106mm recoilless rifle. After a five-hour fight for the complex on February 6, the exhausted Hotel Marines cleared enemy spider holes outside the building, blasted a hole in the wall of the courtyard, and finally captured the key provincial headquarters, suffering 1 dead and 14 wounded compared to 27 NVA killed.
Who Fell Here?
The Department of Defense claims 142 Marines were killed in the fighting south of the Perfume River, but Mark Bowden estimated in Hue 1968: A Turning Point of the American War in Vietnam that 100 Marines were KIA in the first five days of fighting alone (January 31-February 4). The mismatch may be explained by the DOD not counting actions in Hue as an operation until February 3, 1968.
Though the Marines may have suffered a higher number of casualties than officially reported, NVA in this sector suffered almost as many killed on February 2 alone (140) as the DOD claims overall. If one accepts the DOD total of 142 Marines KIA, the NVA lost at least five times as many soldiers killed in this sector of fighting as the Marines.
What did they say about it later?
After fighting all day February 6 to take the Provincial Admin Complex, the Marines of 2/5 were eager to replace the Viet Cong flag that had been flying in the courtyard since the Communists had first taken Hue. Since they were technically acting as a support force to South Vietnam, protocol stated that only the bright-yellow/horizontal-red-striped Republic of Vietnam flag was allowed to fly over the government complex. This was the only time in the war the Marines “ignored the USMACV directive that forbid the display of the U.S. flag without the South Vietnamese national banner beside it” (Camp, 2019, p. 41).
While being filmed by a CBS crew, immediately after taking the provincial HQ, GySgy Frank Thomas “vaulted through a hole in the wall and ran to the flagpole clutching an American flag” (Camp, 2019, p. 40) to break protocol and raise Old Glory solo. Though Thomas and other Marines never knew exactly where the flag came from, all agreed it should be raised. When taking the courtyard appeared imminent, Capt. Christmas radioed Commander Cheatham and told him he was raising the Stars and Stripes when someone monitoring the network warned him it was illegal to run up an American flag. Christmas then turned his radio off, later saying in the History Channel documentary Vietnam on the Frontlines, “I figured that was Cheatham’s problem. Let him take care of that.”
But LtC Cheatham defended the move in the same documentary: “I told them somehow or other there’s an American flag flying over the province headquarters. And that’s when I was told to take it down. And I told them if anybody wants to come up here and take it down…Try.” The similarity to one of the most famous images in American history was not lost on the Marines. Least of all LCpl George Haught, son of an Iwo Jima Silver Star recipient: “It clicked in our minds: Mt. Suribachi.”
U.S. Marine Corps War Memorial in Arlington, VA depicting Marines raising the U.S. flag on Mt. Suribachi February 23, 1945; commonly known as the Iwo Jima Memorial, author’s photo
Though smaller scale fighting occurred south of the Perfume River throughout the next week, by February 11 the area was declared secure and the NVA/VC had been defeated. When a combined ARVN/Marine force retook the Citadel north of the river weeks later, the American flag was removed from the Provincial Admin Complex and the South Vietnamese flag raised anew. It was the final time the Stars and Stripes was raised on foreign soil in combat.
Order of battle for forces engaged in this battlefield guide:
1st Marines Regiment (Col Stanley S. Hughes)
1st Battalion (Col Marcus J. Gravel)
Alpha Company (Capt Gordon Batcheller w, GySgt John Canley)
First Platoon (Lt Rick Donnelly)
Second Platoon (Lt Ray Smith)
Third Platoon (Sgt Alfredo “Freddy” Gonzalez)
5th Marines Regiment (Col Robert D. Bohn)
1st Battalion Citadel Battalion (Col Bob Thompson)
Delta Company (Col Myron Harrington)
2nd Battalion (LtC Ernest C. “Ernie” Cheatham Jr.)
Fox(trot) Company (Capt Michael “Mike” P. Downs)
First Platoon
Second Platoon (Lt Rich Horner)
Third Platoon (Lt Don Hausrath)
Golf Company (Capt Charles L. “Chuck” Meadows”)
First Platoon (2nd Lt Mike McNeil)
1st Squad (Corp Glenn Lucas)
2nd Squad (unengaged)
Second Platoon (2nd Lt Steve Hancock)
1st Squad (LCpl Barney Barnes)
2nd Squad (Corp Lester Tully)
Third Platoon (Lt William “Bill” Rogers)
Hotel Company (Capt George R. “Ron” Christmas)
First Platoon (Lt Leo Myers)
Second Platoon (SSgt John Miller)
Third Platoon (Lt Mike Lambert)
Works Cited
Bowden, Mark. 2017. Hue 1968: A Turning Point Of The American War In Vietnam. Atlantic Monthly Press.
Camp, Richard, 2019. U.S. Death in the Imperial City: U.S. Marines in the Battle for Hue 31 January to 2 March 1968. U.S. Department of Defense.
Columbia, South Carolina, City Directory, 1954, U.S., City Directories, 1822-1995.
Hammel, Eric M. 2006. Fire In The Streets: The Battle For Hue, Tet 1968. Pacifica Military History.
Personal interviews with Hue veterans George Haught and Larry Ortiz
United States Federal Census, Year: 1930; Census Place: Florence, Florence, South Carolina; Page: 27B; Enumeration District: 0013; FHL microfilm: 2341930
United States Federal Census, Year: 1940; Census Place: Florence, Florence, South Carolina; Roll: m-t0627-03808; Page: 20A; Enumeration District: 21-17
Willbanks, James J. 2020. The Battle of Hue 1968: Fight for the Imperial City. Osprey Publishing.
This is chapter 2 of a 3 chapter battlefield guide covering major U.S. Marine sites from the Battle of Hue City in January/February 1968. You can find Chapter 1 here. Stops 2A-2D are below and a Google Maps link of the associated sites is included in each stop title.
Map depicting locations of tour stops associated with U.S. Marines of Golf Company 2nd Battalion/5th Regiment in Hue 1/31/1968
G/2/5 headed north from Phu Bai Combat Base at 10:30 AM on January 31, 1968 to relieve Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (A/1/1), actively engaged with NVA forces in the southern New City of Hue attempting to seize the city as part of the nationwide enemy Tet Offensive.
The company first found signs of A/1/1’s fight just north of Stop 1D from Part 1, where they were hit by small arms fire from the fresh 810th NVA Battalion. Stalled under fire on the exposed road, G/2/5 was able to connect with A/1/1 and begin the process of retrieving the wounded.
Col. Marcus Gravel, now commanding the combined force, gave Lt. Col. Ed LaMontagne, an officer from the accompanying tank battalion, permission to simply bypass the NVA fire and speed to the MACV Compound (Military Assistance Command Vietnam) 900 meters north ofStop 1Dfor reinforcements to rescue A/1/1 and G/2/5.
Pinned down near “a big metal pipe [which] ran under the road between the culverts” (Bowden, 2017, p. 140), the Marine companies were successfully reinforced and able to reach MACV at 2:45 PM. The ease with which G/2/5 arrived at the compound with minimal casualties compared to A/1/1 occurred because the NVA soldiers facing the Americans were a fresh relief battalion more interested in reaching the Citadel than they were in engaging American forces.
Who Fought Here?
A relief force of 160 U.S. Marines and Navy Corpsmen from Golf Company, 2nd Battalion/5th Marines “chopped” (or attached) to the control of 1st Battalion/1st Marines commander Col. Marcus J. Gravel. Despite Gravel’s misgivings of the mission, at 4:10 PM following a rest at the MACV compound, G/2/5 and the command element of A/1/1 loaded onto trucks and advanced a block to the bridge approach 260 meters SW of Stop 2A with a plan to cross the Truong Tien Bridge, assault the Citadel via the Thuong Tu Gate entrance, and rescue ARVN soldiers besieged in the 1st ARVN Division HQ Compound.
The combined force had the following equipment for the upcoming Truong Tien bridge assault:
5 Marine M-48 tanks
2 U.S. Army M-55 quad-50 trucks
2 ARVN Armored Cavalry Battalion M-41 light tanks
Unspecified number of hot-wired civilian vehicles used to rescue wounded
Golf Company was commanded by Capt. Charles L. “Chuck” Meadows and split into 3 platoons with 3 squads each:
First Platoon (2nd Lt. Mike McNeil)
1st Squad (Corp. Glenn Lucas)
2nd Squad* (unengaged; left on south bank to provide crossing with fire support)
Second Platoon (2nd Lt. Steve Hancock)
1st Squad (Lance Corp. Barney Barnes)
2nd Squad (Corp. Lester Tully)
Third Platoon (Lt. William “Bill” Rogers)
They were opposed by the following battalions from the 4th NVA Regiment commanded by Lt. Col. Nyugen Van: (engaged forces bold, unengaged italicized, attached*)
804th NVA Battalion
810th NVA Battalion
815th NVA Battalion
818th NVA Battalion
2 sapper battalions*
This stop itself is a park that was used as a friendly helicopter LZ (landing zone) to evacuate wounded troops as well as a supporting fire position for some Marines of A/1/1 for G/2/5’s assault on the Truong Tien Bridge (then known as Nguyen Hoang Bridge):
Video of Doc Lao Park taken by author in March 2018
Who Commanded Here?
Col. Marcus J. “Mark” Gravel commanded the combined force of G/2/5 and the command element of A/1/1 48 hours short of his 38th birthday on January 31, 1968. The Korean War veteran was described as a kind and sensitive devout Catholic who took the unusual step of learning the names of every Marine under his command. In Mark Bowden’s Hue 1968 he is quoted as often saying, “Whenever one of my Marines gets a scratch, I bleed.” To show solidarity with the ARVN forces who fought alongside him in Vietnam, Gravel sported the rank insignia of an ARVN Lt. Col. on his helmet. After the war, Gravel was stationed at the Pentagon where he worked as a public affairs officer with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (see Flores, 2006, p. 114). He died relatively young at the age of 62 on March 30, 1992 and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.
The planned mission was for G/2/5 to reach the besieged ARVN Compound was by following Highway 1 across the 400-meter-long Truong Tien Bridge, turning left on Tran Hung Dao Street parallelling the north bank of the Perfume River and proceeding 300 meters to the Thuong Tu Gate Road leading to the southeast corner of the Citadel.
Panoramic view originally facing NW of the Truong Tien Bridge spanning the Perfume River in Hue
G/2/5’s bridge crossing was complicated due to a number of factors:
Holes in the bridge span opened straight down into the river due to an unsuccessful NVA attempt to blow the bridge earlier.
ARVN Armored Cavalry Battalion soldiers were fought out and refused to provide M-41 light tanks.
Gravel feared the steel superstructure would not support Patton tanks so they were left behind instead to provide supporting fire from the south bank of the river.
No air support would be provided due to American fears of damaging important South Vietnam cultural sites in the Citadel.
Capt. Meadows reduced the size of the 160-man company to 100 for the bridge crossing and Citadel advance, leaving a reserve squad behind to provide supporting fire.
Who Fought Here?
Lance Corp. Barney Barnes’s squad of 2nd Lt. Steve Hancock’s 2nd Platoon served as the point team and set off at a crouched trot to this point at the crest of the arch of the bridge at Stop 2B where they began to take fire from an NVA machine gun in a bunker at the NW end of the bridge. Because of the arched roadway in the center of the bridge, Barnes’s squad could not see over the center of the bridge. Their view approaching the crest was similar to the below:
To combat the NVA .51 caliber machine gun fire, Pvt. FC Clyde Carter and a Marine machine gun team set up an M60 but Carter was quickly killed. As casualties mounted Barnes reached the northern end of the bridge and reserve squad leader Corp. Lester Tully,in an effort that would earn him the Silver Star, “reduced the NVA machine-gun position with a hand grenade,” killing 5 NVA soldiers (Hammel, 2006, p. 61).
In a June 2013 Leatherneckarticle Army Sergeant Bob Lauver, who assisted in removing wounded G/2/5 men from the bridge, described the actions of Marines who tried in vain to disable the NVA machine gun bunker before Tully got to it: “I saw many Marines of Golf-two-five perform heroic actions that remain unheralded to this day. Many Marines were cut down trying to take out the machine gun in the bunker. I remember a Marine charging the bunker with grenades, only to not make it. Another Marine with an M60 or M16, firing from the hip, also did not make it to the bunker.”
Barnes’s Squad was the first to arrive across the bridge with Tully’s arriving shortly after, thanks in part to fire assistance from 2 U.S. Navy PBRs (riverine patrol boats) deployed from the Hue LCU (landing craft unit) ramp set up earlier in the day (Hammel, Marines in Hue 2015, p. 97). Since 2nd Lt. Steve Hancock’s Platoon (Barnes and Tully’s squads) endured the heaviest fighting on the bridge, Capt. Meadows left them to hold the north end of the bridge while 2nd Lt. Mike McNeil’s 1st Platoon prepared to assault the Thuong Tu Gate and enter the Citadel.
Who Commanded Here?
Capt. Chuck Meadows was 28 at the time of the Battle of Hue on his second tour of duty in Vietnam. The beloved captain of Golf Company was an apolitical Marine unconcerned over the politics of the war. Hospital Corpsman Bruce Gant treated G/2/5’s wounded at Hue and said of Meadows: “He loved his men and they loved him. He was their skipper for life.” After the war, Meadows returned to Vietnam to work with Peace Trees, a nonprofit group responsible for finding and disabling unexploded ordnances. He also returned often to host veteran reunion groups. Meadows led a group of G/2/5 veterans across the Truong Tien Bridge on a reunion visit for the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Hue. It would be his final visit to the country. Meadows died unexpectedly from a heart condition in his home in Oregon on March 1, 2018, just 3 weeks after leading the anniversary visit. Corpsman Gant said of the final visit: “When we said goodbye in Hanoi last month, I shook his hand and told him I loved him. That’ll always be with me,” (Nelson-Jones, 2018).
Plucky-eared 19-year-oldOklahoman PFC Clyde “Butch” Carter was the first member of Golf Company to be killed in the Battle of Hue. He was killed by machine gun fire from the NVA bunker on the north end of Truong Tien Bridge while attempting to set up M60 counter battery fire. On his Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund page a remembrance left for Carter from Eva Gilreath Johnson is addressed to “My close friend/first love, Clyde” and states, “I miss you and I love you, soulmate. You are my Special Angel. Our Memories are special.” Carter is buried at Sunny Lane Cemetery in Del City, Oklahoma.
In the aforementioned Leatherneck article by R.R. Keene chronicling a February 2013 Veteran reunion in Hue, Larry Verlinde of 1st Platoon-2nd Squad remembered moving out for the Truong Tien Bridge assault shouting, “Whoopee! We’re all gonna die!” an apparent reference to the chorus of the 1967 Country Joe and the Fish Vietnam protest song “I-Feel-Like-I’m-Fixin’-to-Die Rag.”
McNeil’s undersized platoon containing only Corporal Glenn Lucas’s Squad was ordered to take over G/2/5 company lead and turn left at Stop 2C down Tran Hung Dao Street towards the Thuong Tu Gate Road and Citadel beyond. Hancock’s Platoon remained back at the bridge to interrogate captured NVA soldiers and recuperate during a period of relative quiet. Lucas’s Squad (of McNeil’s Platoon) continued on an uneventful, but eerily quiet walk to the Thuong Tu Gate Road intersection 300 meters south of Stop 2C.
The above video shows McNeil’s Platoon’s journey to Thuong Tu Gate Road via Tran Hung Dao Street with relevant timestamps below:
0:00-0:12 Turning left from the bridge onto Tran Hung Dao Street (NVA machine gun bunker site from Stop 2B at 0:10)
0:13-0:17 View McNeil’s Platoon had as they advanced up Tran Hung Dao
0:18-0:26 NVA view looking south towards Thuong Thu Gate Road/Tran Hung Dao intersection
What did they say about it later?
Many Marines of Lucas’s Squad later remarked about a movie theater they passed in the commercial district along Tran Hung Dao Street that stood out as they made their way to the Thuong Tu Gate Road. However either due to intense focus on the mission or the fog of war, veterans of G/2/5 remember differently what the theater was showing.
In Mark Bowden’s Hue 1968, the author quotes Capt. Meadows as saying the theater was advertising the Italian Western Tempo Di Massacre (Bowden, 2017, p. 146). However, in Eric Hammel’s Fire in the Streets he describes McNeil’s Platoon as passing a movie theater showing Gone With the Wind. (Hammel, 2006, p. 62). As you can see in the comparison photo below, a 1968 photo shows the actor name “Franco Nero,” the Italian Spaghetti Western film star from Tempo Di Massacre, putting the mystery to rest.
Top: The movie theater as it stood in March 2018, author’s photo. Bottom: The movie theater as it stood on January 31, 1968. Source: “Golf” Company at Hue Leatherneck June 2013, p. 40 Lance Corp. Ray “Q” Quist from the lower photo was shot in both legs on the Thuong Tu Gate Road shortly after this photo was taken. He survived the wounds, but later died of cancer.
When the Marines of Lucas’s Squad arrived turned right at the Thuong Tu Gate Road intersection 100 meters south of Stop 2D, Corp. Lucas was rudely welcomed by NVA AK-47 fire from atop the Citadel wall at the Thuong Tu Gate entrance here. Though Lucas was wounded by gunfire, he led his squad to a point 50 meters north of the intersection where the point squad “came under intense fire from atop the Citadel wall and particularly from positions within the gate” (Hammel, 2006, p. 63).
Above: Author’s photo of the imposing Thuong Tu Gate NVA firing position taken March 2018
8 Marines of Lucas’s Squad fell seriously wounded and found themselves in a dangerous position exposed on both sides of the road. PFC Bill Tant frantically attempted to find cover, but finding all of the shop doors along the road locked he had to settle for a small tree 50 meters from Stop 2D. Corp. Lucas attempted to make the same tree but fell gravely wounded in the road. Hospital Navy Corpsman Donald Kirkham treated wounded Marines all along the dangerously exposed sidewalk, but was shot in the throat and killed while attempting to reach squad leader Lucas (see Hammel, 2006, p. 64, first paragraph). 5 Marines now lay dying in the immediate area of Tant’s tree, with no way to move forward or retreat.
Above: Photo taken by Corp. William Peterson from the R.R. Keene article “Golf” Company at Hue’ Leatherneck June 2013, p. 40 showing Corp. Lucas and Hospitalman Kirkham lying killed in action near Tant’s tree
With his company being cut to pieces, at this point in the sunny January afternoon, Capt. Chuck Meadows decided to find a spot closer to the action to command from: the front. Meadows made his way to a tree in front of a pharmacy just meters from the Citadel moat, the farthest G/2/5 advance of the day. He went to work trying to improve the outmanned and outgunned position his company found itself in.
Above: Roughly Capt. Meadows view towards the Thuong Tu Gate Road from the pharmacy and witness tree. Photo taken by author
Below: Modern photo of pharmacy location, author’s photo.
Standing as a blue and green 2-story building today, in 1968 the pharmacy was a white 1-story building that allowed for roof access, so Capt. Meadows ordered an M-60 machine gun team up to the roof to fire on NVA positions inside the Thuong Tu Gate. From this position it was evident that G/2/5 could move no further due to the imposing NVA defensive position, and the only thing left to do was evacuate the stranded men around Tant’s tree. M-79 smoke grenades fired from the pharmacy roof allowed G/2/5 to extricate all but 1 of their stranded casualties: PFC Gerald Kinny.
The above video shows relevant sites from Lucas’s Squad’s fight at the commercial intersection fronting the Thuong Tu Gate moat and entrance to the Citadel with relevant timestamps below:
0:27-0:35 View of pharmacy and Meadows’s witness tree
0:36-0:49 Likely location of Tant’s witness tree surrounded by wounded from Lucas’s Squad
0:50-0:59 View of NVA defensive position atop the Thong Tu Gate from Meadows’s position in front of the pharmacy
Who Fell Here?
From his position in front of the pharmacy, Capt. Meadows could see the 18-year-old sibling-of-8 PFC Kinny lying motionless in the road. With the “No Man Left Behind” Marine mantra in mind, Meadows “ignored the heavy fire and sprinted toward him. His adrenaline pumping, with his rifle in one hand, he grabbed Kinny by the belt buckle and lifted him with one arm. Running for all he was worth, he half dragged and half-carried him” to a convoy removing the wounded though he was dead on arrival (Bowden, 2017, p. 148).
After accounting for all of the men in McNeil’s Platoon involved in the mess in front of the Thuong Tu Gate, Meadows radioed back to the combined force commander Col. Gravel and told him “that, on his own authority, he was pulling back to the Nyugen Hoang Bridge” (Hammel, 2006, p. 65) and MACV Compound. Gravel ensured a military convoy of trucks would cross Truong Tien Bridge (also called Nyugen Hoang) to assist in evacuating Golf Company’s wounded and the disastrous mission was complete with a withdrawal across the bridge complete at 7:00 PM.
From 4:10-7:00 PM on January 31, 1968 G/2/5 suffered a 33% overall casualty rate (7 killed, 45 wounded). However, this is a bit misleading since the number of forces who actually crossed the bridge was 100, making Golf Company’s engaged forces casualty rate 52%. With the 1st ARVN Division HQ Compound still under siege inside the Citadel and G/2/5 failing to penetrate the Thuong Tu Gate entrance, the company returned to the MACV Compound and regrouped for a new set of orders to fight the NVA block by block in the New City south of the Perfume River. In one day of fighting in Hue the 2 infantry companies of A/1/1 and G/2/5 suffered 80 casualties out of a combat force of 300 Marines, for an overall casualty rate of 27%.
Secondary accounts differ on the number of G/2/5 Marines killed in action on January 31 ranging from 5 to 10 KIA. I was able to account for 7 deaths attached to the fighting in this post from primary and secondary accounts. Of those 7 losses, below are 4 Marines mentioned in this post who have publicly available memorial pages:
Location of Casualty: Thuong Tu Gate Road in front of pharmacy
Casualty Detail: Other explosive device
What did they say about it later?
George Haught served in Second Platoon gun squad and participated in the assault on the Thuong Tu Gate. When Capt. Meadows ordered a team of Marines to the roof of the pharmacy for a better position, Haught climbed on top of the pharmacy roof with the assistance of a boost from another Marine. During my March 2018 visit to Hue, I messaged with Haught and shared photos of the visit. Upon my sharing the below comparison photo of the Thuong Tu Gate destroyed in 1968 and intact in 2018, Haughtsaid simply: “I am glad we never made it through that gate. We all would have been destroyed.”
Continue to chapter 3 of this series where we will follow the start of Fox, Golf, and Hotel Companies’ block-by-block fighting in the New City.
Works Cited
Bowden, Mark. (2017). Hue 1968: A Turning Point Of The American War In Vietnam. Atlantic Monthly Press.
Flores, John W. (2006). When the River Dreams: The Life of Marine Sgt. Freddy Gonzalez. AuthorHouse.
Hammel, Eric M. (2006). Fire In The Streets: The Battle For Hue, Tet 1968. Pacifica Military History.
Hammel, Eric M. (2015). Marines in Hue City: A Portrait of Urban Combat Tet 1968. Pacifica Military History.
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